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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN DISTRICT COURT 
Defendants Miles Walter Langley and Robert P. Thorpe are listed as defendants in 
this lawsuit, but neither is a party to this appeal. 
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant/Appellee Ranger Insurance Company ("Ranger") agrees with the 
Jurisdictional Statement in Appellants George Lee and Gerald Lee's ("the Lees") 
Appellate Brief. 
II. ISSUES PRESERVED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATIONS OF ISSUES BELOW 
The parties have not previously raised or briefed in any depth the issue of whether 
a bail agreement violates public policy to the extent it purports to permit a bail 
enforcement agent not licensed in Utah to apprehend a fugitive. At most, the notion that 
Utah's public policy could preclude enforcement of the bail agreement was mentioned in 
passing in one sentence of the Lees' principal brief to the Court of Appeals: 'There is no 
known authority for the proposition that parties can get together in one state and contract 
away the public policy and statutes of another state, yet that is what the court allowed in 
this trial." Lees' Appellate Brief to Court of Appeals, at 8-9. Because the Lees' 
argument to the Court of Appeals regarding public policy was so cursory, Ranger did not 
brief the issue. Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not focus its analysis on public policy 
issues when analyzing whether to affirm the bail agreement at issue in this case. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised the 
first time on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346; Monson v. 
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). Although this Court could choose to answer 
the issue presented on judicial efficiency grounds, remand for consideration by a lower 
court would also be jurisprudentially appropriate. 
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Additionally, the issue as framed may well be moot. It assumes the bail bondsman, 
Mr. Langley, was not licensed in Utah, yet there is no evidence in the record that 
establishes that. 
III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no statutes or rules that are determinative of the issue on appeal. 
While the Lees claim that Utah Code Ann. § 31A-35-601 (1999), "Acts of [Bail 
Bond] Agent," and § 53-11-101, et seq, "Bail Bond Recovery Act," govern this appeal, 
the trial court noted that these statutes apply to sureties and bail recovery agents who are 
licensed in Utah. (R. 1187, p. 6). Because the Lees argue that Mr. Langley did not have a 
Utah license—despite the fact that nothing in the record establishes that Mr. Langley did 
not have a Utah license—there is no issue regarding whether or how the statutes should 
be applied in this case. Instead, it appears the Lees rely on these statutes purely to the 
extent that the statutes express Utah's public policy regarding bail recovery. That does 
not render the statutes "determinative," and the Court need not construe nor apply the 
statutes in this case. Moreover, the statutes do not prohibit a bondsman duly licensed in 
another state, as Mr. Langley undisputedly was, from entering Utah to apprehend a 
fugitive pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. 
To the extent the Court relies on the statutes to indicate Utah's public policy on 
bail recovery, Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-8.5 (1998), is instructive. It authorizes a surety to 
arrest a fugitive "at any time . . . and at any place within the state" for the purpose of 
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surrendering him to the court. (Appellants' Brief to Utah Court of Appeals, Addendum at 
25). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Parties, Course of the Proceedings and Disposition 
Below. 
The Appellants are brothers George and Gerald Lee, two Utah residents who claim 
they were assaulted by a Colorado bail recovery agent, Miles Langley, on April 2, 1999, 
in Vernal, Utah. (R. 2). At the time of the alleged assault, there were two outstanding 
warrants in Colorado for Gerald Lee, one for driving under the influence and one for 
operating a vehicle without a driver's license. (R. 1187, p. 105; R. 999 Exhibit 1, pp. 
001-002). 
Defendant Robert P. Thorpe owned A-1 Bail Bonds ("A-1M), a bail bond agency in 
Grand Junction, Colorado. (R. 1187, p. 254; M. Thorpe depo. p. 6).1 Maria Thorpe, his 
wife, was also an owner. (R. 1187, p. 254; M. Thorpe depo. pp. 5-6). Shortly after 
Gerald Lee was arrested in Colorado in 1998 for the two separate offenses, he purchased 
two bail bonds from A-1; the purchase of these bonds allowed him to be released from the 
jail in Colorado until his initial criminal court hearings. (R. 1187, p. 106; Exhibit 2, pp. 
008-010). 
*Page 254 of the trial court transcript notes that witness Maria Thorpe's deposition 
transcript was made part of the record. (R. 1187, p. 254). However, it appears that the clerk of 
the trial court did not assign a separate page number for her deposition transcript in the record. 
When citing portions of Ms. Thorpe's deposition transcript in this brief, Ranger has cited to the 
page of the trial transcript where her deposition transcript is made part of the record, then cites to 
the page of the deposition transcript containing the relevant testimony. 
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Ranger is a bail bond surety insurer in Texas. (R. 1187, pp. 256-58). Ranger 
contracted with A-1, through a general agent known as North American Bail Bond 
Services ("NABBS"), to supply surety bail bonds. (R. 1187, pp. 258-59; R. 999, Exhibit 
2, p. 018). Ranger acted as principal and A-1 as independent contractor. (R. 999, Exhibit 
2; R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo., pp. 51-52). The Bail Bond Underwriting Agreement 
signed by A-1, Ranger and NABBS provides that A-1 is "solely responsible for . . . the 
apprehension,.. . arrest, extradition and/or surrender of errant bond principals 
[fugitives]." (R. 999, Exhibit 2, p. 020). A-1 also agreed to conduct apprehensions of 
fugitives "properly and lawfully in compliance with all laws, statutes, regulations and 
prudent business practices utilized in the bail bond business." (R. 999, Exhibit 2, p. 020). 
Miles Langley was a Colorado resident who was licensed as a bail recovery agent 
in Colorado. (R. 1187, pp. 56, 62-63). No evidence was presented regarding whether he 
was licensed in Utah. He was self-employed. (R. 1187, p. 61). Mr. Langley claimed A-1 
hired him to apprehend Gerald Lee, a claim contested by A-1. (R. 1187, p. 74; R. 1187, 
p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. p. 39). It was undisputed that Mr. Langley was never an 
employee, independent contractor or agent of Ranger. (R. 1187, p. 259). The Lees 
deposed Mr. Langley in connection with this lawsuit, but he died before trial. (R.l 187, p. 
55). 
The Lees filed a Complaint in the Eighth Judicial District Court in Vernal, Utah, 
against Mr. Langley, Mr. Thorpe in his capacity as owner of A-1, and Ranger in its 
capacity as bond surety. (R. 2; R. 1187, p. 33). The Complaint alleges that on April 2, 
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1999, Mr. Langley, acting as an employee of A-l, apprehended Gerald Lee in Vernal, 
Utah, in order to take him to Colorado on the arrest warrants. (R. 2). The apprehension 
occurred at the home of George Lee, and during the apprehension, a scuffle ensued 
between the Lee brothers and Mr. Langley. (R. 3). The Lees allege they sustained 
physical injuries during the fight. (R. 3). The Complaint lists assault and battery, kidnap, 
and reckless endangerment, as the causes of action. (R. 3). The Complaint seeks both 
compensatory and punitive damages. (R. 3). 
This case was tried to a jury in Vernal on February 2-4, 2004, with Judge Lynn 
Payne presiding. (R. 1187). Neither Mr. Thorpe nor Mr. Langley appeared at trial, 
leaving Ranger as the only defendant present. (R. 1187). Although the Lees did not 
plead false imprisonment in their Complaint, Judge Payne permitted them to present this 
claim to the jury, in addition to claims for assault, reckless endangerment and punitive 
damages. (R. 1187). After the Lees presented their case in chief, Judge Payne granted 
Ranger's motion for partial directed verdict, resulting in dismissal of the false 
imprisonment claim. (R. 1187, pp. 213, 222-23). The jury answered the Special Verdict 
form by finding that Mr. Langley did not assault or recklessly endanger the Lees, 
resulting in a no cause verdict for Mr. Langley, A-l, and Ranger. (R. 1009-1012). 
B. Statement of Facts, 
1. Gerald Lee was Arrested Twice in Colorado in 1998 for 
Criminal Offenses. 
Gerald Lee was arrested in November 1998, in Grand Junction, Colorado, for 
driving under the influence of alcohol. (R. 1187, p. 105, R. 1187 p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. 
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p. 14). He was also arrested in Rio Blanco, Colorado, in late 1998, for driving without 
proof of insurance. (R. 1187, p. 105). The warrants for his arrest on both charges are still 
outstanding. (R. 999, Exhibit 7). 
2. Mr. Lee Purchased Two Bail Bonds from A-l in Order to be 
Released from Jail. 
While in jail for these offenses, Mr. Lee purchased two bail bonds from A-l. (R. 
999, Exhibit 2, pp. 016-017). Mr. Lee entered into a Bail Bond Application and Contract 
with A-l. (R. 999, Exhibit 2, pp. 008-010). Ranger was the surety for these bonds, 
meaning that if Mr. Lee failed to appear for court hearings in Colorado and the bonds 
were forfeited, Ranger guaranteed to pay the Colorado court for the forfeiture. (R. 1187, 
p. 258). 
Because Mr. Lee purchased these bail bonds, he was released from jail 
immediately. (R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. p. 10; R. 1187, p. 141). More 
specifically, the Colorado court released him into A-l's custody. (R. 1187, p. 254, M. 
Thorpe depo. p. 12). Mr. Lee was aware that if he failed to show up for court hearings in 
Colorado, it would cause a forfeiture of the bonds. (R. 1187, p. 146). Additionally, his 
failure to appear would cause a warrant for his arrest to issue. (R. 999, Exhibit 1, pp. 
001-002). 
3. Mr. Lee Contractually Agreed that A-l Could Arrest Him if He 
Failed to Appear for Colorado Court Hearings. 
In exchange for Ranger acting as surety and A-l acting as bonding agent so that 
Gerald Lee could be released from jail, he promised Ranger and A-l several things in the 
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Bail Bond Application and Contract. (R. 999, Exhibit 2, pp. 008-010). First, he agreed 
that upon his release from jail until his appearance at court hearings, "Ranger shall have 
control and jurisdiction over me . . . and shall have the right to apprehend and surrender 
me to the proper officials at any time . . . . " (R. 999, Exhibit 2, p. 008). He further agreed 
that if he left Colorado or failed to appear for court hearings, "Ranger and/or its Agent 
shall have the right to forthwith apprehend and surrender me in exoneration of my bail 
bonds . . . ." (R. 999, Exhibit 2, p. 008). Thus, if Mr. Lee failed to show up for court 
hearings in Colorado, A-1 had the right to apprehend him and return him to jail in 
Colorado. (R. 1187, p. 262; R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. p. 14). 
Third, he agreed that if he left Colorado and was apprehended by A-1, he "agree[d] 
to voluntarily return to [Colorado], and . . . waive extradition proceedings and hereby 
consent to the application of such reasonable force as may be necessary to effect such 
return." (R. 999, Exhibit 2, p. 008). It was undisputed that this clause gave A-1 the right 
to apprehend Gerald Lee if he left Colorado. (R. 1187, p. 263). Mr. Lee never contended 
at trial that he entered the contracts under duress or that the contracts were otherwise 
illegal or void. 
4. Mr. Lee Failed to Appear for Court Hearings in Colorado 
Related to the Two Offenses. 
The court in Rio Blanco, Colorado, scheduled a hearing on Mr. Lee's license 
violation for December 16, 1998. (R. 1187, p. 265). The court in Mesa County, 
Colorado, scheduled a hearing on Mr. Lee's DUI violation for January 25, 1999. (R. 
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1187, p. 265). Mr. Lee failed to show up for either court hearing. (R. 1187, p. 109-110).2 
Mr. Lee testified that he knew that by failing to appear, he had caused a forfeiture of the 
bail bonds. (R. 1187, p. 146). A-1 had the right at this point to apprehend Mr. Lee 
because he had violated "not only his bail bond conditions with the court, but he also 
violated his bail bond application and contract.. . ." (R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. 
pp. 20-1). 
On December 16, 1998, the Rio Blanco court issued a Notice of Forfeiture, 
addressed to Mr. Lee, A-1 and Ranger, stating that since Mr. Lee failed to show up for his 
court hearing the week before, the bail bond was in danger of being forfeited. (R. 1187, 
p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. pp. 29-30; R. 999, Exhibit 1, pp. 006-007). The court allowed 
A-1 until April 20, 1999, to bring Mr. Lee into court, or else the bond would be forfeited 
and Ranger or A-1 would have to pay the court $500 for Mr. Lee's failure to appear. (R. 
1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo., pp. 30-32).3 
5. A-1 Attempted to Bring Gerald Lee into Court to Avoid 
Forfeiture of the Bonds. 
Beginning in February 1999, A-1 made several unsuccessful attempts to locate Mr. 
Lee and bring him into court in Colorado. (R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo., p. 34). 
These attempts included calling Mr. Lee's former employer, who had co-signed on the 
2He testified at trial that he failed to appear for the hearings because they were scheduled 
on the same day, which obviously was not true. (R. 1187, pp. 109-110, 145). 
3The Mesa County Court issued a Notice of Forfeiture on January 25, 1999, ordering Mr. 
Lee to appear on March 9, 1999, but is is not known what became of this (R. 999, Exhibit 1, p. 
004). 
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bonds, and calling Mr. Lee's mother in Vernal. (R. 1187, p. 254, pp. 34-38). On April 1, 
1999, Maria Thorpe called his employer again and told him she would be coming to 
Vernal soon to pick up Mr. Lee and remand him back to the Colorado court's custody. 
(R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. pp. 38). 
6. Miles Langley Apprehended Gerald Lee on April 2,1999. 
Maria Thorpe testified that she did not have a chance to apprehend Mr. Lee 
herself, because Miles Langley traveled to Vernal and apprehended him without her 
direction or knowledge. (R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. p. 38). Ms. Thorpe testified 
that A-l did not ask or hire Mr. Langley to apprehend Mr. Lee but speculated that he 
learned of the impending forfeiture of the bond, and therefore the right to apprehend Mr. 
Lee, by looking through courthouse records for Notices of Forfeiture. (R. 1187, p. 254, 
M. Thorpe depo pp. 39-40). 
The Lees deposed Mr. Langley in 2002. (R. 1187, p. 55). He testified that he was 
a licensed bail recovery agent in Colorado in 1999. (R. 1187, p. 64). The Lees did not 
inquire whether he was licensed as a bail recovery agent in Utah in 1999. (R. 1187, p. 
55). However, Mr. Langley had apprehended fugitives in Utah "numerous times" prior to 
1999. (R. 1187, p. 70). 
Mr. Langley testified that he went to the Mesa County courthouse to confirm that 
there was an outstanding warrant for Mr. Lee's arrest on a DUI charge. (R. 1187, p. 75). 
He drove to the Vemal Sheriff's Department on April 2, 1999, where he told the assistant 
sheriff he was going to apprehend Mr. Lee. (R. 1187, p. 82). The assistant sheriff told 
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Mr. Langley that Mr. Lee was staying at the home of his brother George Lee and gave 
him general directions to George Lee's home. (R. 1187, p. 82). As Mr. Langley neared 
George Lee's home, he stopped at the Naples Police Department and told a police officer 
that he was in town to apprehend Gerald Lee. (R. 1187, p. 83). After Mr. Langley 
showed the officer the arrest warrant, the officer gave Mr. Langley specific directions to 
George Lee's home. (R. 1187, p. 83). Neither police department inquired whether Mr. 
Langley was licensed in Utah. 
Mr. Langley arrived at George Lee's home and entered the home after telling 
George Lee, who answered the door, that he was with a construction company and 
wanted to give Gerald Lee a job. (R. 1187, pp. 85-86). Mr. Langley entered the home, 
shook Gerald Lee's hand, then told him he had a warrant for Mr. Lee's arrest. (R. 1187, 
p. 86). A scuffle ensued, and George Lee testified that as he went to help his brother, Mr. 
Langley elbowed him. (R. 1187, pp. 192-193). Gerald Lee testified that he was also 
physically injured in the fight. (R. 1187, p. 119). 
Officers from the Naples Police Department arrived at George Lee's home shortly 
afterward.4 (R. 1187, p. 90). Mr. Langley took Gerald Lee into custody and drove him to 
Grand Junction, Colorado, where he was put in jail. (R. 1187, p. 97). Gerald Lee 
testified that he went with Mr. Langley because Naples police officer Steve Hatzidakis 
told him he would be arrested if he did not accompany Mr. Langley. (R. 1187, p. 125). 
^hey cited Langley and the Lees for assault. (Appellants' Brief, xii). Mr. Langley later 
plead down his citation to disorderly conduct. (R. 1025). 
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7. Judge Payne Dismissed the Lees' False Imprisonment Claim 
Because They Could Not Meet the Legal Elements of This Claim. 
At the close of the Lees' case in chief, Ranger moved for a partial directed verdict 
to dismiss the Lees' false imprisonment claim. (R. 1187, p. 213). The judge concluded 
that George Lee had presented no evidence that Mr. Langley confined or imprisoned him; 
Mr. Langley merely entered his home and allegedly struck him, but that action did not 
equate to confinement or imprisonment. (R. 1187, pp. 213-215, 222). Judge Payne 
further concluded that Gerald Lee had presented no evidence that Mr. Langley acted 
without reasonable grounds to believe Gerald Lee had committed an offense. (R. 1187, 
pp. 215-16). To the contrary, there were two separate legal bases for Mr. Langley to 
apprehend Gerald Lee: one stemming from Mr. Lee's contractual assent to be 
apprehended in the Bail Bond Application and Contract, and one stemming from the 
common law set forth in Taylor v. Taintor, 89 U.S. 366 (1872), which confers a right 
upon bail bondsmen to apprehend fugitives. (R. 1187, pp. 215-16). 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The bail agreement at issue in this case does not violate Utah's public policy. It 
does not purport to allow anyone to do anything contrary to Utah law. Rather, it 
effectively limited Gerald Lee's ability to sue Ranger and Mr. Langley after Mr. Lee 
became a fugitive and thereby created a need for his apprehension. 
Enforcement of the bail agreement is consistent with Utah's public policy. 
Colorado has the same public policy interests as Utah in regulating bail recovery agents. 
Mr. Langley satisfied Colorado's regulations for bail recovery, since he was licensed in 
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Colorado. It is uncontested that Mr. Langley would have had the statutory authority to 
arrest Lee but for his alleged lack of a Utah license.5 Multiple public policy goals are at 
stake; Utah's interest in regulating the practice of private bail recovery is no more 
important than its interest in making sure that fugitives at large within its borders are 
apprehended. Enforcing the bail agreement best balances Utah's various public policy 
interests. 
Extensive common law, based on Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 287 (1873), 
establishes the right of a bail recovery agent to apprehend fugitives across state lines 
under bail agreements such as the one in this case. Comity principles also require that 
Utah accord due deference to bail recovery agents who meet the standards established by 
other states' bail recovery regulations, as long as those other states' regulations are 
substantially similar to Utah's regulations and serve the same public policy goals as 
Utah's regulations. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
THE BAIL AGREEMENT AT ISSUE DOES NOT VIOLATE UTAH PUBLIC 
POLICY 
A. The Bail Agreement Did Not Purport to Permit Any Action Contrary 
to Utah Law. 
The bail agreement in this case did not allow Ranger or Mr. Langley to flout the 
law. It simply permitted Gerald Lee to, in exchange for being released from jail, contract 
away the right to bring a civil suit against a bail enforcement agent if he fled the 
5Again, there was no evidence presented at trial, and no evidence in the record, that Mr. 
Langley was not licensed in Utah. 
12 
jurisdiction and thereby created a need for the agent to apprehend him. The contract 
provided, in pertinent part: 
1. Ranger shall have control and jurisdiction over me during the term 
for which my bail bond(s) is executed and shall have the right to 
apprehend and surrender me to the proper officials at any time for 
violation of my bail bond(s) obligations to the Court and Ranger as 
provided by law. 
2. It is understood and agreed that any one of the following actions by 
me shall constitute a breach of my obligations to Ranger and that 
Ranger and/or its Agent shall have the right to forthwith apprehend 
and surrender me in exoneration of my bail bond(s): 
a. If I depart the jurisdiction of the court without written consent 
of the court and Ranger or its Agent. 
3. If I depart the jurisdiction of the Court wherein my bail bond(s) is 
posted by Ranger for any reason, and I am captured by Ranger and/or 
its Agent. . . in a State other than the one in which my bail bond(s) is 
posted, I hereby agree to voluntarily return to the State of original 
jurisdiction, and I hereby waive extradition proceedings and further 
consent to the application of such reasonable force as may be 
necessary to effect such return. 
{Lee v. Langley, 2005 UT App 339 at \ 2, 129 P.3d 33). The contract says nothing about 
whether the bail recovery agent must comply with the bail recovery laws of other 
jurisdictions into which a fugitive may flee. It does not purport to exempt the bail 
recovery agent from any criminal liability that may arise from the manner in which he 
apprehends a fugitive. All the contract in this case did was prevent Gerald Lee from 
suing Mr. Langley for apprehending him pursuant to the contract. As the Court of 
Appeals correctly explained, "Langley's authority to arrest Lee arose from the bail 
contract, and that authority existed even if its exercise by Langley, an unlicensed bail 
n 
enforcement agent, was illegal." Id. at <f 10 (citing Mosley v. Johnson, 453 P.2d 149, 152 
(1969)). 
The Lees have made no attempt to refute this crucial analysis of the Court of 
Appeals: "While the bail contract would not relieve Langley from criminal liability under 
the Act, it does preclude Lee from arguing in this civil action that Ranger—and by 
extension Langley—had no authority to apprehend him in Utah." Id. at \ 15 (citing 
Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1087 (Wyo. 1999) (holding that contracting parties 
"are not permitted to assert actions in tort in an attempt to circumvent the bargain they 
agreed upon")). Utah's statutes on bail recovery do not prohibit parties from privately 
agreeing that a bail recovery agent can apprehend a fugitive. The Lees do not claim, as 
they cannot, that any statutory language actually specifically prohibits bounty hunters 
licensed elsewhere from apprehending fugitives in Utah. The Lees' argument in its brief 
to this Court is simply that enforcement of a contract, freely entered into, contravenes 
Utah's supposed public policy regarding bail recovery. To the contrary, Utah's public 
policy strongly weighs in favor of finding the contract enforceable. 
B. Utah's Public Policy Strongly Supports Enforcing the Bail Agreement 
There is substantially more depth to Utah's public policy on bail recovery than the 
Lees suggest. The Lees emphasize the statutory requirement that a bail recovery agent in 
Utah be licensed, but the Court should consider the reasons why licensing is required. 
The Lees exalt the licensing requirement as if licensing itself was an end goal of Utah's 
public policy, when it is simply a means to effectuate that public policy. 
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1. Colorado's Bail Recovery Agent Requirements Foster the Same 
Public Policy Goals as Utah's Bail Recovery Agent 
Requirements. 
Understanding Utah's public policy on bail recovery requires more than mere 
recognition of the fact that Utah requires bail recovery agents to be licensed. Licensing is 
essentially a means to ensure that bail recovery agents do not have criminal backgrounds, 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-11-108(1 )(2), and have attained a minimum level of training in 
fugitive apprehension. Id. at 53-1 l-108(4)(b). The statute mandates a training program 
of at least sixteen hours in length, which must include training in four main areas: 
"instruction on the duties and responsibilities" of a bail recovery agent, "the laws and 
rules relating to the bail bond business," "the rights of the accused," and "ethics." Id. § 
53-1 l-108(4)(a)(I) - (iv). Additionally, a bail recovery agent must also have a minimum 
of 1,000 hours of "experience consisting either of actual bail recovery work, or work as a 
law enforcement officer." Id. at § 53-11-11 l(l)(a). 
Not surprisingly, Colorado, where it is undisputed that Mr. Langley was licensed, 
has the same public policy goals with respect to bail recovery. Those goals are evident in 
Colorado's requirements for bail recovery agents. In Colorado, someone applying to be a 
bail recovery agent must first have his fingerprints taken by a law enforcement agency. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-7-105.5(2) (2003). The law enforcement agency then submits 
those fingerprints to the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (the "CBI") for a background 
investigation. Id. During the background investigation, the CBI checks the applicant's 
fingerprints against both its own records and those of the FBI. Id. § 12-7-105.5(3). The 
1S 
purpose of the background investigation is to ensure that the prospective applicant has 
never "been convicted of or pled guilty or nolo contendre to any felony under federal or 
state law during the previous fifteen years." Id. A bail bonding agent cannot hire a bail 
recovery agent without first confirming that the applicant has successfully passed the 
background check. Id. § 12-7-105.5(l)(a). 
In addition to passing a criminal background check, Colorado requires that an 
applicant to be a bail recovery agent receive formal training in "bail fugitive 
apprehension." Id. § 12-7-105.5(l)(b). This training must conform to the standards 
established by the "peace officers standards and training board" ("POST"). Id. The bail 
recovery training program entails a minimum of sixteen hours of instruction on five main 
subjects: Introduction to Bail Recovery, Principles of Criminal Culpability, Colorado 
Criminal Code, Firearms and Weapons, and Seizure-Entry. See Colorado Department of 
Regulatory Agencies ("DORA"), Notice of Prelicensure Education Requirements For 
Bail Bonding Agents ("Colorado Education Requirements"), Addendum A at 2, 76; 
compare with Utah Code Ann. § 53-1 l-108(4)(a)(I) - (iv) (requiring sixteen hour training 
program in "duties and responsibilities" of a bail recovery agent, "the laws and rules 
relating to the bail bond business," "the rights of the accused," and "ethics"). One of the 
three primary learning objectives of the course on "Introduction to Bail Recovery" is 
specific instruction on Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 287 (1873). See Colorado Education 
6At http://www.dora.state.co.us/insurance/regs/b07-99.doc (indicating Bail Recovery 
Training Program adopted by POST on 12/4/98). 
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Requirements at 7. A bail bonding agent's license will be revoked if he knowingly hires a 
bail recovery agent who failed the criminal background check, or is not POST-certified in 
bail fugitive apprehension. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. at § 12-7-106(l)(b). 
"It is uncontested that Langley would have had the statutory authority to arrest Lee 
but for his lack of a [Utah] license." Lee, 2005 UT App. 339 at f 15 (citing W. Page 
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 36 at 226 (5th ed. 1984) 
(licensing statutes create no liability if the actor is competent but unlicensed)). The Lees 
do not dispute Mr. Langley's competence or qualifications. Mr. Langley had the 
background, training, and experience to operate as a Utah bail recovery agent by meeting 
the requirements to obtain a Colorado license. He was licensed in Colorado, but the Lees 
claim, without supporting evidence, he was not licensed in Utah. That does not warrant 
invalidating the bail contract. 
2. Utah's Other Public Policy Goals, Such As Encouraging Private 
Bail Recovery, and Avoiding Creation of a Haven for Fugitives, 
Support Enforcing the Bail Recovery Agreement. 
Utah's public policy strongly favors the use of private bail recovery agents to 
apprehend fugitives. While Utah has an important public policy interest in regulating bail 
recovery agents, it also has equally important public policy interests in seeing that 
fugitives from Utah's justice system are apprehended. Likewise, Utah has a strong 
interest in seeing that fugitives who flee to Utah from other states are apprehended, lest 
Utah become a haven for out-of-state fugitives. See Boudreaux v. State, 1999 UT App. 
310, \ 27, 989 P.2d 1103 (citing Emig v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043, 1049 (Utah 1985) 
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(noting that state into which fugitive has fled has a "strong interest" in delivering fugitive 
back to state from which fugitive fled)). As long as bail agreements such as the one at 
issue in this case are enforceable, all three of these public policy interests are protected. 
If the bail agreement in this case were invalidated, the current balance of public policy 
interests would be upset. 
The current system of private bail recovery, when reasonably regulated, serves all 
of these interests. This system is built on 134 years of reliance on Taylor v. Taintor. 
Colorado and Utah (and, it is safe to assume, other states as well) have enacted statutes to 
ensure that bail recovery agents are law-abiding and competent in safe fugitive 
apprehension. Were this Court to determine that the bail agreement is invalid because 
Mr. Langley was licensed in Colorado but allegedly not licensed in Utah, the logical 
extension of that determination is that Utah bail recovery agents cannot pursue fugitives 
who have committed criminal offenses in Utah into other states, to bring those fugitives 
back to Utah so they are held accountable for their transgressions. If Utah bail recovery 
agents were forced to stop pursuing fugitives to other states, Utah's interest in 
apprehending those fleeing Utah's justice system would be stymied. 
Utah could become a haven for fugitives if fugitives in other states were able to 
throw off their pursuers by crossing into Utah. If the bail agreement were unenforceable, 
companies such as A-l would have to employ a different bail recovery agent for every 
state into which a fugitive fled, geometrically increasing the cost of providing bail 
services. This added cost would hurt not just bail bonding companies, but also people 
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who wish to be bailed out of jail, many of whom would find bail unaffordable. Many 
more people would stay in jail, overwhelming jail facilities.7 Mr. Langley testified that 
he had apprehended fugitives in Utah on several prior occasions without incident. On this 
occasion, he informed local law enforcement authorities that he was apprehending Mr. 
Lee pursuant to valid Colorado arrest warrants. The Utah authorities did not stop Mr. 
Langley or inquire if he was licensed in Utah; instead, they acknowledged his authority to 
7See Jonathan Drimmer, "When Man Hunts Man: The Rights and Duties of Bounty 
Hunters in the American Criminal Justice System," 33 Houston L. Rev. 731, 761-62 (1996). 
Drimmer has explained: 
Moreover, bondsmen and bounty hunters help ease prison overcrowding, a 
condition which, by 1987, had resulted injudicial rulings in almost every state 
finding the state correctional system unconstitutional and ordering major changes. 
To relieve the burden on prisons and help decrease state pretrial detention costs, 
courts began to set lower bail rates. Although lower bail rates cause more 
defendants to be freed on bail before trial, they also cause more defendants to fail 
to properly appear in court. Cuts in police budgets and manpower has made it 
impractical to chase those defendants, leading states and bondsmen to increase 
their reliance on bounty hunters, whose participation in the criminal justice system 
saves the state expenses associated with searching for, arresting, and transporting 
the suspect to court. 
The increased reliance states and bondsmen place on bounty hunters is 
well deserved. Based on their expertise and economic incentives, bounty hunters 
are significantly more effective at retrieving fugitives than the police, returning 
99.2% of suspects committed to the custody of bondsmen. Because of that 
proficiency, police also enlist the aid of bounty hunters to help track down elusive 
criminal suspects before an initial arrest or after an escape, and experts have even 
proposed entirely privatizing fugitive retrieval through the use of bounty hunters. 
Thus, state privatization efforts and endeavors to decrease prison overcrowding 
and costs have made bondsmen and bounty hunters valuable participants in state 
pretrial detention programs. 
. . . The ultimate beneficiaries of bounty hunters' comprehensive 
powers are the states themselves, who are freed from the financial burdens of 
confining suspects until trial, or searching for fugitives, while remaining 
assured that those defendants appear for trial. 
Id. at 761-64 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
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apprehend Mr. Lee and directed Mr. Langley to his whereabouts. Such cooperation 
between bail recovery agents and law enforcement authorities clearly comports with 
Utah's public policy on bail recovery, and a Utah license was not required for this 
cooperation to occur. 
C. Common Law and Comity Principles Provide Ample Justification for 
Affirming the Court of Appeals, 
The Lees wrongly assert that "[t]he old federal common law right of a bail 
bondsman to pursue a fugitive in another state was eliminated by the adoption of Title 
53." Lees' Appellate Brief at 23. The Lees' reasoning flies in the face of fundamental 
rules of statutory interpretation: 
It has been said that statutes are not presumed to make any alterations in the 
common law further than is expressly declared, and that a statute, made in 
the affirmative without any negative expressed or implied, does not take 
away the common law. The rules of the common law are not to be changed 
by doubtful implication, nor overturned except by clear and unambiguous 
language. In order to hold that a statute has abrogated common law rights 
existing at the date of its enactment, it must clearly atppear that they are 
repugnant to the act or thereof invoked, that their survival would in effect 
deprive it of its efficacy and render its provision nugatory. 
Shijflett v. State, 560 A.2d 587, 591-92 (Md. App. 1989) (internal quotation omitted) 
(holding that Maryland's statutory codification of bail bondsmen's rights "clearly" did not 
abrogate bail bondsmen's rights with respect to their principals), ajfd, 572 A.2d 167 
(Md. 1990). 
Moreover, although the Court of Appeals based its analysis primarily on the 
language of the bail agreement itself, see Lee, 2005 UT App. 339 at \ 15 (finding bail 
contract "does preclude Lee from arguing in this civil action that Ranger . . . had no 
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authority to apprehend him"), extensive precedent and principles of comity also justify the 
decision to enforce the contract. 'The bondsman's authority to arrest and deliver the 
principal derives from three overlapping sources: (1) the common law principles 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Taintor . . .; (2) statutory authorization; and 
(3) the contract between the surety and the principal." State v. Tapia, 468 N.W.2d 342, 
343 (Minn. App. 1991) (finding bounty hunter did not have authority to forcibly break 
into third party's home to apprehend fugitive). 
The Lees' assertion that "the best that could be said for Langley's legal status 
would be that he . . . [made] a citizen's arrest," Lees' Appellate Brief at 17, is wrong, 
because it ignores his Colorado license, the bail agreement and well over a century of 
case law built around such bail agreements. "In point of fact, the authority of a bail 
bondsman in relationship to his principal is quite a bit broader [than that of a "private 
citizen's right to effect an arrest]." Shijflett v. State, 560 A.2d 587, 590-91 (Md. App. 
1989); see also Tapia, 468 N.W.2d at 344 ("A bail bondsman has at least the same 
authority a private citizen would have to make a citizen's arrest." (emphasis added)). 
1. Taylor v. Taintor Has Formed the Backbone of Bail Recovery 
Law for 134 Years. 
The Lees cited no case law from other jurisdictions showing, under analogous 
circumstances, that Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366 (1872), is no longer good law on the 
right of a bounty hunter to pursue fugitives into Utah. "The most frequently quoted 
exposition of the bondsman's common law arrest powers was set forth in Taylor v. 
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Taintor, 83 U.S. 366 (1872)." Bailey v. Kenney, 791 F. Supp. 1511, 1521 (D. Kan. 1992). 
In Taylor, the United States Supreme Court held that 
[w]hen bail is given, the principal [fugitive] is regarded as delivered to the custody 
of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment. 
Whenever they choose to do so, they may seize him and deliver him up in their 
discharge . . . . They may pursue him into another State; may arrest him on the 
Sabbath; and if necessary, may break and enter his house for that purpose. 
Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. at 371. "[E]ven where there are statutory provisions that the 
bail may arrest the principal on a bailpiece or certified copy of the recognizance, these 
provisions have sometimes been held to be cumulative and not to affect the common law 
right to arrest without process." Frasher v. State, 260 A.2d 656, 660 (Md. App. 1970). 
Courts in numerous cases have relied upon Taylor and its progeny when affirming 
the right of a bail recovery agent to pursue and apprehend a fugitive across state lines. 
For example, in Hunt v. Steve Dement Bail Bonds, Inc., the court cited Taylor to 
emphasize the expansive rights sureties have traditionally possessed to arrest their 
principals. 914 F. Supp. 1390, 1393 (W.D. La 1996). JnSallee v. Werner, 111 111. App. 
96 (1912), two men had entered into a bail agreement (which the court called a 
"recognizance") in Illinois. Id. at 1. They became "fugitives from justice" when they 
crossed state lines to Indiana, in violation of their bail agreement. Id. The court held that 
all the bail recovery agent needed to apprehend the two men, "whether they were in the 
State of Indiana or elsewhere," was a copy of the bail agreement. Id. "[T]he bail in a suit 
entered in another state have a right to seize and take the principal in a sister state 
In re Von DerAhe, 85 F. 959, 961 (C.C. W.D. Penn. 1898) (internal quotation omitted). 
99 
Although the Lees believe that Taylor's discussion of the bail bondsman's 
common law right to apprehend fugitives across state lines was mere dicta, Lees' 
Appellate Brief at 20, numerous courts have relied on Taylor over the past 134 years. In 
particular, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals cited Taylor and emphasized the contractual 
nature of the surety's right to cross state lines to apprehend fugitives: "As this right is a 
private one and not accomplished through criminal procedure, there would seem to be no 
obstacle to its exercise wherever the surety finds the principal. Needing no process, 
judicial or administrative, to seize his principal, jurisdiction does not enter into the 
question." Fitzpatrickv. Williams, 46 F.2d40, 41 (5th Cir. 1931). The court explained 
Taylor in depth, detailing the Taylor court's analysis on why the bail recovery agents had 
a right to '"seize [the fugitive] wherever they could find him,'" and stated, "[o]bviousIy, 
this was not dictum." Id. (emphasis added). 
The Lees downplay Taylor v. Taintor by referring to a few cases from other 
jurisdictions in which the courts determined under different circumstances that state 
statutes could override the common law. For example, Walker v. Commonwealth, 127 
S.W.3d 596 (Ky. 2004), concerned a bondsman who detained an individual in Kentucky 
without an arrest warrant, in violation of Kentucky law prohibiting a bondsman from 
detaining without a warrant. In this case, there were two valid arrest warrants for Gerald 
Lee, and Utah's bail recovery statutes are different from Kentucky's. The case of Green 
v. State, 829 S.W.2d 222 (Texas App. 1992), is inapposite because the Texas court 
concluded that the state legislature intended to abrogate Taylor v. Taintor by passing laws 
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that squarely contradicted it. As explained above, the Lees cannot point to any Utah 
statute that contradicts the common law principle of apprehension in another state set 
forth in Taylor v. Taintor. The court in Johnson v. County of Kittitas, 11 P.3d 862 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2001), expressed its view that Taylor v. Taintor contains dicta but also 
acknowledged that "it is generally understood to be the seminal authority on the bond 
surety's common law authority to seize and surrender the principal. . . ." Johnson, 11 
P.3d. at 864. Finally, the court in McFarland v. State, 666 N.W. 2d 621 (Iowa Ct. App. 
2003), simply noted that Taylor v. Taintor did not allow a bondsman to break into the 
home of an innocent third party he mistakenly thought was housing a fugitive. In the 
instant case, George Lee was harboring a fugitive, and Mr. Langley did not break in. 
Taylor v. Taintor remains good law, relied upon by bail recovery agents all over 
the country—including, undoubtedly, Utah bail recovery agents pursuing fugitives into 
other states. A determination by this Court that bondsmen cannot cross state lines to 
bring a fugitive back to the state where the crime was committed would contravene long-
established law and procedures in the criminal justice system. 
2. Comity Requires Cooperation With Other States in the 
Regulation and Facilitation of Private Bail Recovery. 
Because Colorado's bail recovery regulations serve the same public policy goals as 
Utah's, comity principles should allow licensed bail recovery agents from Colorado to 
operate in Utah under bail contracts such as the one in this case. "Comity is the principle 
that a court, for considerations of public policy, should defer to a court of another 
jurisdiction or to a coordinate branch of government and is a matter that calls for the 
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exercise of judicial discretion." Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1146 (Utah 1991). 
Among the reasons courts may extend comity to the laws of another state are "to foster 
cooperation, promote harmony, and build goodwill among sister states." Jackett v. Los 
Angeles Dept. of Water and Power, 111 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing 
Barry Lee v. Miller County, Arkansas, 800 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
This case is analogous to cases involving choice-of-law issues where a court must 
decide whether to extend sovereign immunity to an action against another state's 
governmental entity in that court. In Jackett, a Utah trial court declined to assert 
jurisdiction over a California governmental entity, citing the doctrine of comity. 771 P.2d 
at 1076. The Utah Court of Appeals found this decision to be "fair, just, and abundantly 
sensible." Id. One of the key reasons for this conclusion was that the legal 
issue—whether to grant immunity—was treated similarly by both the pertinent Utah and 
California statutes, because both Utah and California had two-year limitations periods. 
Id. at 1077. "Thus, the court was applying a statute of limitations consonant with Utah 
public policy . . . ." Id. 
Even where some differences exist between different states' laws, a court can 
properly rely on comity. In Barry Lee v. Miller County, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals explained that the doctrine of comity permits a court to recognize the laws of 
other states even if those laws are "not in harmony" with a forum state's laws, as long as 
those laws are not contrary to the forums state's public policy. 800 F.2d at 1375. The 
court explained, 
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mere disparity between the law of Texas and that of the other state involved 
is not enough to preclude enforcement of the other sovereign's law. Rather, 
the law of the other state sought to be recognized in Texas must be so 
antithetical to Texas public policy as to violate good morals, natural justice, 
or [be] prejudicial to the general interest of [Texas] citizens. 
Id. The court explained that it would recognize other states' laws unless those laws were 
"repugnant to Texas public policy." Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
Apprehension of fugitives from justice is the kind of task states need to cooperate 
on for the common good. It is analogous to the civil defense emergencies that the Barry 
Lee court said justified extending comity: 
The state extending comity often does so to maintain harmony and foster 
cooperation. We can think of very few situations that present as starkly the 
need to maintain harmony and foster cooperation as the one before us. As 
was the case with the bucket brigades used to battle fires decades ago, the 
need for cooperation in civil defense matters is paramount. 
800 F.2d at 1378. As with the civil defense matters in Barry Lee, apprehension of 
fugitives is an issue of tremendous cross-jurisdictional importance. Utah should not send 
the message to other states with this case that their bail recovery regulations are 
inadequate or inferior to Utah's regulations. 
CONCLUSION 
Gerald Lee had two outstanding warrants for his arrest in Colorado in 1999. He 
would have been required to remain in jail in Colorado until his court hearings had A-1 
not issued him bail bonds releasing him from the court's custody into A-l's custody. In 
exchange for his freedom, he agreed that if he failed to show up for court hearings or left 
Colorado, A-1 could apprehend him. He further promised that if he were apprehended by 
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A-1, he would voluntarily agree to return to Colorado. Finally, he consented to the use of 
reasonable force against him to assure his return to Colorado. (R. 999, Exhibit 2). 
The Court should affirm based on basic principles of contract law, well-established 
common law, Utah's public policy, and comity. Even more fundamentally, the Court 
should affirm the common sense notion that those who try to evade the law by leaving 
one state for another can be brought to justice. 
DATED this y\^r day of February, 2006. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Bulletin 7-99 
Notice Of Prelicensure Education Requirements For Bail Bonding Agents 
Issue and Effective Date: November 1, 1999 
background 
This Bulletin replaces Bulletin 14-98. In 1998 the General Assembly enacted §12-7-102.5(l)(b), 
C.R.S. which mandated bail recovery prelicensure education for all post January 1, 1999 
applicants applying for a bail bonding agent license. In 1999 the General Assembly enacted §12-
7-102.5(l)(6), C.R.S. which mandated bail bond prelicensure education for all Professional Cash 
Bail Agents. The purpose of this Bulletin is to inform the bail bond insurance industry and 
prelicensure course providers of the requirements for prelicensure education for bail bond 
licensure applicants, and to provide forms to be used by the provider when applying to the 
Division of Insurance for: 
• Approval of a bail bond prelicensure education course or program. 
• Certification of the applicant's satisfactory completion of the bail bond prelicensure course or 
program, as required by §12-7-102.5(l)(a) & (6), C.R.S. 
• Registration of bail recovery training. 
• Certification of the applicant's satisfactory completion of bail recovery training, as required by 
§12-7-102.5(l)(b), C.R.S. 
Action necessary 
• Regarding Bail Bonds - eight clock hours: 
All applicants for initial licensure must submit evidence of satisfactory completion of approved 
prelicensure education or training courses. Such education or training shall consist of the 
following: 
Criminal Court System - 2 hours 
Bail Bond Industry Ethics - 2 hours 
Laws Relating to Bail Bonds - 4 hours 
Bail bond prelicensure education courses must be certified, registered and reviewed by the 
Commissioner pursuant to §10-2-203, C.R.S. 
Contact the Division of Insurance for copies of Regulation 1-2-11 which contains the 
requirements for approval of bail bonding agent prelicensure education courses or 
programs and standards for satisfaction of prelicensure education requirements by bail 
bonding agent applicants. This Bulletin contains forms to be used by providers applying 
for bail bonding agent prelicensure course or program approval and for certification of 
completion. 
• Regarding Bail Recovery - sixteen clock hours: 
Effective January 1, 1999 all applicants for initial licensure must submit evidence of satisfactory 
completion of bail recovery prelicensure education training which complies with the curriculum 
adopted by the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board (P.O.S.T.). The 
curriculum for bail recovery training was approved by P.O.ST, on December 4, 1998. The 
P.O.S.T. education or training consists of the following: 
Introduction to Bail Recovery - 3 hours 
Principals of Criminal Culpability - 3 hows 
Colorado Criminal Code - 6 hours 
Firearms and Weapons - 2 hours 
Seizure - Entry - 2 hours 
A copy of the P.O.S.T. approved bail recovery curriculum is attached. Bail recovery course 
providers may register their courses or program with the Division of Insurance. In order to 
register a bail recovery course or program, the provider must certify that the course or program 
complies with the curriculum established by P.O.S.T. on the registration form provided in this 
bulletin. 
This Bulletin also contains the form to be used by providers for certification of completion of 
bail recovery training. 
further information 
Prelicensure education requirements shall not apply to a person applying for reinstatement of a 
canceled or expired bail bonding agent license, if such license has been inactive for one year or 
less, or if such person has been licensed in another state for at least one year and has completed 
or satisfied prelicensure requirements which are substantially similar to Colorado requirements. 
Any requests or questions concerning Bail Bonding Agent Prelicensure Education should be 
directed to: 
bail bond compliance section 
Division of Insurance 
1560 Broadway, Suite 850 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
303-894-7499 
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State of Colorado 
Division of Insurance 
1560 Broadway, Suite 850 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
303-894-7499 
Application for approval of Bail Bonding Agent 
Prelicensure Education Course or PROGRAM 
The provider named below requests approval of the general outline of training attached and requests that the listed 
hours be approved for meeting bail bonding agent prelicensuie education requiiements 
Education or training shall consist of 
(c hec k courses in pmqram) 
Criminal Court System 2 hours 
Bail Bond Industry Ethics 2 hours 
Laws Relating to Bail Bonds 4 hours 
Type ot education or training piogram 
(check as appropriate) 
Con espondence Coui se 
Seminar 
Classroom 
Othei (Please explain below) 
Name ot Provider (This name must show on e\ ery Certificate of 
Completion of Prelicensure Education for Bail Bonding Agents) 
Date Submitted 
' Contact Person 
Name of Instiuctor 
Address 
Phone J 
DIVISION USE ONLY 
Program approved 
PrOGRAM DENIED 
Date appioved 
Approving official 
DOI BB PL A (12/98) 
State of Colorado 
Division of Insurance 
1560 Broadway, Suite 850 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
303-894-7499 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION 
This is to Certify that: . Social Security Number: 
has successfully completed Bail Bonding Agent Prelicensure Education as follows: 
(c heck as appropriate) 
The criminal court system 
Bail bond industry ethics 
Laws relating to bail bonds 
2 hours 
2 hours 
4 hours 
Provider 
Name of Instructor 
Signature of Instructor 
Course Number 
(As assigned by the Division of Insurance) 
Date of Completion 
This form is to be furnished IN DUPLICATE by the provider to each individual who has successfully 
completed a course approved by the Division of Insurance for bail bonding agent prelicensure education. 
DOl BB CC (5/95) 
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State of Colorado 
Division of Insurance 
1560 Broadway, Suite 850 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
303-894-7499 
registration of bail RECOVERY training 
The provider named below registeis the following Bail Recoveiy Training Program. 
Education or training shall consist of 
(check as appropriate) 
Intieduction to Bail Recovery 3 hours 
Pi inciples of Criminal Culpability 3 hours 
Colorado Ci iminal Code 6 hours 
Firearms and Weapons 2 houis 
Seizure - Entry 2 hours 
Type of education or training: 
(check as apptopnate) 
Correspondence Couise 
Seminar 
Classroom 
Other (Please explain below) 
Name of Providei (This name must show on every Certificate of 
Completion of Bail Recovery Ttainmg) 
Date Submitted 
1 Contact Person 
Name of Instructor 
Address 
Phone 1 
1 DIVISION USE ONLY 
Date received: 
I certify that the Bail Recovery Training included in this program 
complies with the cun iculum established by P.O.S.T. 
Signature of Provider if an individual, Date 
or signature of Otficer of Providei | 
DOI BR PLA (12/98) 
State of Colorado 
Division of Insurance 
1560 Broadway, Suite 850 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
303-894-7499 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION 
This is to Certify that: 
has successfully completed Bail Recovery Training as follows: 
Social Security Number: 
(check as appropriate) 
Introduction to bail recovery 
principles of criminal CULPABILITY 
Colorado criminal code 
firearms and weapons 
Seizure - entry 
3 hours 
3 hours 
6 hours 
2 hours 
2 hours 
Provider 
Name of Instructor 
Signature of Instructor 
Date of Completion 
I certify that the Bail Recovery Training included in this program complies with the curriculum established by 
P.O.S.T. 
Signature of Provider if an individual, or signature of Officer of Provider Date 
This form is to be furnished IN DUPLICATE by the provider to each individual who has successfully 
completed a course registered with the Division of Insurance for bail recovery training education. 
DOI BR CC (12/98) 
6 
adopted by p.o.s.t. on december 4,1998 
BAIL RECOVERY TRAINING PROGRAM 
MINIMUM REQUIRED HOURS 16 
A. INTRODUCTION TO BAIL RECOVERY 
RECOMMENDED HOURS 3 
General learning goal: The student will have basic knowledge of the 
Colorado Revised Statutes pertaining to Bail Recovery 
Learning objectives: 
1. The student will explain the provisions of C.R.S. Title 12, 
Article 7, Part 1. 
2. The student will be able to recognize and describe the provisions 
of C.R.S. 20-1-103, 24-31 -303(1 )(h), and 24-33.5-412 (1)(p). 
3. The student will be familiar with Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 
83 US. 287 (1873). 
B. PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL CULPABILITY 
RECOMMENDED HOURS 3 
General learning goal: The student will explain the concept of 
Criminal Culpability 
Learning objectives 
1. The student will explain and describe the definitions and elements 
of CRS Title 18, Article 1, Part 5 and 6 
2. The student will understand the provisions of CRS 16-11-309(a) 
sub paragraphs (I) and (II) as they elate to violent crimes. 
3. The student will describe and explain the provisions of CRS 
18-1-704 thru 18-1-707(7) as they pertain to the use of 
physical and deadly force. 
C. COLORADO CRIMINAL CODE 
RECOMMENDED HOURS 6 
General learning goal: The student will have basic knowledge of the 
Colorado Criminal Code. 
Learning objectives 
1. The student will be able to identify the elements of the following 
statutes and definitions as they pertain to potential violations by 
bail recovery agents: 
a. Definitions 18-1 -901 (3)(c),(d),(e),(g),(h),(m) and (p) 
b. Murder 18-3-102 and 103 
c. Manslaughter 18-3-104 
d. Criminally negligent homicide 18-3-105 
e. Assault in first degree 18-3-202 
f. Assault in second degree 18-3-203 
g. Assault in third degree 18-3-204 
h. Menacing 18-3-206 
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i. Reckless endangerment 18-3-208 
j . False imprisonment 18-3-303 
k. Criminal mischief 18-4-501 
I. First degree criminal trespass 18-4-502 
m. Second degree criminal trespass 18-4-503 
D. FIREARMS AND WEAPONS 
RECOMMENDED HOURS 2 
General learning goal: The student will have basic knowledge 
of offenses relating to firearms and weapons. 
Learning objectives: 
1. The student will be able to explain the definitions and identify 
the elements of the offense for the following CRS codes: 
a. Definitions 18-12-101 
b. Title 18, Article 12 except 18-12-108.5 thru 18-12-108.7 
E. SEIZURE-ENTRY 
RECOMMENDED HOURS 2 
General learning goal: The student will understand the concept of 
Probable Cause. 
Learning objective: 
1. The student will explain the concept of Probable Cause and 
Totality of Circumstances as established in Colorado Court 
decisions 
